A theory of planned media choice by Hartmann, T.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Chapter 3
Action Theory, Theory of 
Planned Behavior and Media 
Choice
Tilo Hartmann
Action theory regards people as  decision- makers who follow intentions and 
voluntarily pursue their goals (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). According to this 
theory, people may be affected by environmental and inner pressures and 
affordances, but ultimately behavior is guided by reflective,  higher- order cog-
nitive processes (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Westerick, Renckstorf, Lammers, 
& Wester, 2006). People’s  higher- order cognitive processing responds to 
immediate “forces” such as internal drives or external pressures, but is not 
considered to be fully determined by them. Accordingly, action theory 
underlines the capability of people to cognitively ponder their environment 
and to run projections regarding various outcomes before they choose an 
option and undertake an action. A full explanation of media choice from the 
perspective of action theory involves the following three components: (1) it 
stresses users’  decision- making (Frisch & Clemen, 1994; Marewski, Galesic, 
& Gigerenzer, this volume), which may include a  likelihood- estimation and 
evaluation of possible rewards and costs (c.f., Eccles & Wigfield, 2002); (2) 
it highlights the way in which intentions are developed within the decision 
process; (3) it explicates how an intention is eventually implemented and 
shielded against competing action plans (Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen & 
Beckmann, 1990); and (4) it thus tells how intentions result in actual behav-
ior (Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005).
 A specific theoretical framework, which originated in social psychology 
and strongly builds on  action- theoretical ideas, is the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TOPB; Ajzen, 1988, 1991; see Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005, for an 
excellent summary; see for reviews, Armitage & Conner, 2001; Hagger, 
Chatzisarantis, & Biddle, 2002; Conner & Armitage, 1998; Sutton, 1998). 
TOPB can be understood as an extension of its precursor, the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
for a comparison of TRA and TOPB, see Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992). 
The scope of TOPB is—as already suggested by the labels “planned behav-
ior” and “reasoned action”—predicting and explaining human behavior that 
is based on motivational choices and intentions.
 This chapter discusses an application of TOPB to media choice. The first 
269_03_Media Choice.indd   32 23/1/09   11:19:12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Theory of Planned Behavior and Media Choice  33
section introduces the theory, defines the core scope of the theory, and dis-
cusses the potential boundaries of the scope. The second section reviews 
existing applications of TOPB to the realm of media choice, and the third 
section concludes the chapter with a review of the potential of TOPB to 
inspire research on media choice via discussing initial steps towards a theory 
of planned media choice.
General Assumptions of the Theory of Planned 
Behavior
TOPB is considered a general framework in which to explain and predict 
behavior that is, at least to a certain degree, under volitional control (Ajzen, 
1991) and as such depends on a person’s free will. The model does not 
predict behavior that is either completely determined by external forces or 
pressures (e.g., experiencing an accident) or that is under the complete 
command of autonomous mechanisms (e.g., getting ill, sneezing, compulsive 
behavior). TOPB explains behavior as an observable action (e.g., watching) 
defined by a specific situation (e.g., in the living room), linked to a specific 
target (e.g., the television) and restricted to a certain episode (e.g., within 
the next 14 days). The behavior may also occur repeatedly across similar situ-
ations (compound behavior; e.g., frequency of television use in the living 
room over the next 14 days).
 According to TOPB, behavior is determined by the interaction (Ajzen, 
1991, p. 188) of an intention (which indicates “how hard people are willing 
to try” (p. 181)) and the degree of actual control exerted over the behavior 
(p. 183). Behavior that is at least to certain a degree under volitional control 
will be performed if people really want to perform it and if they have the 
resources and abilities to do so. If the behavior is solely under volitional 
control (i.e., does not require any specific efforts, skills, or resources), its per-
formance would depend entirely on one’s intention.
 According to TOPB, a person’s intention to carry out a behavior builds 
on his/her motivational disposition, which entails three factors: (1) a favor-
able attitude toward the behavior (i.e., evaluating the behavior as good, 
healthy, worthwhile, valuable, etc.), (2) subjective norms (i.e., believing that 
important others will approve of conducting the behavior and even carry it 
out themselves), and (3) a perceived behavioral control over the behavior 
(i.e., believing that it is generally possible to carry out the behavior, and that 
one is able to carry it out; cf. Figure 3.1).
 Each of these three factors (methodologically addressed as “direct mea-
sures”) is thought to be a function of a specific set of people’s expectancies 
and evaluations of salient outcomes or attributes (including costs) that 
people associate with a behavior (cf. “ expectancy- value estimations,” Eccles 
& Wigfield, 2002, p. 118; Marewski et al., this volume; Wolling, this volume; 
methodologically addressed as “indirect measures”). People’s attitude 
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towards a behavior is a function of how likely they deem different outcomes 
associated with the behavior, and how desirable they find these outcomes 
(behavioral beliefs): people develop a favorable attitude towards the behavior 
if they perceive the outcomes to be both highly likely and desirable. People’s 
subjective norms build on their beliefs about the normative expectations of 
relevant others and the motivation to comply with these expectations (nor-
mative beliefs). Subjective norms have a positive influence on behavior if 
people think that relevant others (friends, parents, classmates, etc.) appreciate 
the behavior or even pursue it themselves, and if people are at the same time 
willing to comply to their social surrounding.
 It is commonly the case that behavior not only depends on people’s will, 
but also on favorable external circumstances. The last of the three determi-
nants outlined above, perceived behavioral control, therefore builds on the 
factors that people think may facilitate or impede the behavior, as well as the 
presumed power of these factors (control beliefs). Following TOPB, behav-
ioral control is high if people consider it possible for them to carry out the 
behavior (cf. “ self- efficacy,” Bandura, 1997); that is, behavioral control is 
high if people think the expected circumstances will ease the behavior and/
or if people believe they are capable of overcoming circumstances that they 
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Figure 3.1  The theories of reasoned action and planned behavior (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 2005, p. 194).
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expect to impede the behavior. A person may believe, for example, that 
playing a multiplayer video game ultimately depends on the circumstance 
that another player is available. Accordingly, the perceived control regarding 
the playing of a multiplayer game will be low if the person believes that no 
other player will be present.
At the Borders of TOBP: Automatic Behavior Under 
Volitional Control
Behavior is often elicited in a spontaneous, impulsive manner. Such behavior 
is said to be triggered automatically by environmental stimuli (Bargh & 
Barndollar, 1996). Automatic behavior is usually carried out in a mindless 
fashion; i.e., without conscious reflection. Media choices are also commonly 
automatic (Jaeckel, 1992; LaRose, this volume; Marewski et al., this volume). 
For example, after a hard day’s work a tired person may become aware of the 
television set and feel an immediate drive to switch it on (cf. Fazio, 1990). 
She/he may pursue this “decision” with little reflection, switching on the TV 
somewhat mindlessly. If such automatic behavior reflects the fact that the 
person has successfully carried out the same action in the same context many 
times previously, it can be termed a habit (Oulette & Wood, 1998; Verplan-
ken & Aarts, 1999). Mindless and automatic behavior, such as the habit of 
watching TV, seems to be the opposite of deliberative, conscious, and voli-
tional behavioral conduct that falls within the scope of TOPB (cf. Connor & 
Armitage, 1998). In this context, it is appropriate to ask whether TOPB fails 
to explain and predict many instances of media choice.
 According to TOPB, behavior is volitional if it depends on intentions. 
Many researchers stress the idea that intentions are elaborate and conscious 
plans of action that build on a symbolic interpretation of future situations 
(Smith & DeCoster, 2000).  Higher- order cognitive processes are involved in 
the symbolic anticipation of the future, enabling one to pursue a free will; 
i.e., to disentangle environmental or inner stimuli from behavioral responses 
(Kuhl & Goschke, 1994). According to this view, behavior that follows 
intentions and that, as such, is under volitional control, requires  higher- order 
cognitive elaborations (Smith & DeCoster, 2000); these elaborations are 
usually costly because they demand greater cognitive resources than auto-
matic processes. People engage in such demanding cognitive processes only 
if a situation does not allow a reliance on more efficient, mindless responses 
(Fazio &  Towles- Schwen, 1999). When making a decision, people engage in 
elaborate cognitive processes—particularly if the decision entails a consider-
able risk—because important goods or considerable investments are at stake 
(Esser, 1996; Fazio &  Towles- Schwen, 1999); however, people can only 
engage in  higher- order cognitive processes if the situation does not require 
urgent action, providing the time and opportunity to think before arriving at 
a decision (Fazio, 1990; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
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 In contrast, if people care little about the outcomes of a decision, if they 
do not have time to care, or if they are simply familiar with the decision and 
no longer need to care, decisions are more likely to be based on mindless 
processes than on  higher- order cognitive elaborations. From this perspective, 
it seems that  low- involvement, impulsive, or habitual media choices rest on 
environmental or inner forces that only trigger mindless mental processes, 
not elaborate cognitive thinking (e.g., “implicit attitudes,” c.f., Wilson, 
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; “reduced impulse control,” Tice, Bratslavsky, & 
Baumeister, 2001). Accordingly, automatic media choices would not depend 
on an intention, and therefore would not be covered by TOPB. The scope of 
TOPB would then be limited to media choices that are planned, as they 
involve a considerable risk because they are  cost- intensive (e.g., deciding to 
go to the movies), tap crucial values or other important personal beliefs (e.g., 
deciding to watch a film about the Holocaust), and/or are simply unfamiliar 
(e.g., deciding to use a computer for the first time).
 Does TOPB indeed fail to account for many instances of media choice, 
then? It may also be argued that automatic processes commonly build on the 
same motivational dispositions as those built upon by more deliberate pro-
cesses. In addition, most automatic processes may remain under volitional 
control to a certain extent, as people willingly let them happen but may be 
able to intervene if desired.
 One argument in light of this perspective is that spontaneous automatic 
behavior may result from automatically formed attitudes, normative beliefs 
and control beliefs, and an intention that is quickly established  on- line (Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 2000). The cognitive association of  action- relevant beliefs (i.e., 
the association of possible outcomes and the estimation of their likelihood 
and their evaluation) is not necessarily a conscious and elaborate process: 
people do not need to deliberately weigh the pros and cons associated with a 
behavior to make a decision and perform the behavior. As suggested by 
Ajzen and Fishbein (2000), behavioral attitudes, as well as normative and 
control beliefs, may form spontaneously after the outcomes and attributes 
associated with the behavior have come to mind automatically and sublimi-
nally. Subsequently, these spontaneously established and implicit beliefs may 
guide behavior (cf. Fazio, 1990). For example, after becoming aware of their 
television set, people may automatically associate watching television with an 
enjoyable and highly desirable  mood- state. Based on this association, they 
may quickly form a positive attitude, followed by an intention to perform the 
behavior. Because the opportunity already exists, they may mindlessly turn 
on the TV (Fazio, 1990). Zapping (Bilandzic, this volume) and avoidance 
behavior (Fahr & Boecking, this volume) provide other examples of such 
spontaneous media choices.
 Spontaneous automatic behavior may rest on automatically formed or 
implicit attitudes, norms and control beliefs that result in a quickly estab-
lished intention to perform the behavior; however, Ajzen and Fishbein 
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(2000) proposed that a person’s spontaneous motivational disposition forms 
neither arbitrarily nor heuristically, but is a function of existing associations 
(or beliefs; for a different opinion, see Marewski et al., this volume). Related 
media choices would still fall within the scope of TOPB, as “at the most basic 
level of explanation, the [theory] postulates that behavior is a function of 
salient information [. . .] relevant to the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 189). 
However, researchers need to capture a person’s subjective associations that 
in general underlie his/her media choices; i.e., a person’s salient (highly 
accessible) belief structure (Ajzen, 1991; Connor & Armitage, 1998). 
However, to the extent that a person’s implicit and explicit motivational dis-
position diverges (Wilson et al., 2000), and automatically associated aspects 
or salient beliefs differ between real life and in survey situations, and to the 
extent that people evaluate and weigh different associated aspects in a con-
trasting fashion, TOPB may fail to provide an accurate model of spontaneous 
automatic behavior.
 Research on implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999) provides 
another argument as to why automatic behavior may still be affected by voli-
tional control and intentions. Implementation intentions have the format of 
if–then plans: “If situation X arises, then I will do Y!” (Achtziger, Gollwitzer, 
& Sheeran, 2008, p. 381). Accordingly, “implementation intentions create a 
mental link between a selected cue or situation” (e.g., the television set) and 
“a  goal- directed response” (e.g., watching TV, Achtziger et al., 2008, p. 
381). If a critical cue is present, “the respective response is executed immedi-
ately and without further conscious intent” (Gollwitzer & Brandstaetter, 
1997, p. 382).
 Gollwitzer (1999) suggests that people form implementation intentions 
based on their general intentions (or goal intentions), which are thought to 
build on the determinants suggested in TOPB. General intentions reflect 
more of what a person wishes to do in the  long- term, whereas implementa-
tion intentions focus more on the means to achieve a chosen  long- term goal. 
For example, a person may form the general intention to withstand the pain 
of loneliness. She holds a positive attitude towards this behavioral goal, and 
her friends strongly support her efforts to withstand loneliness. Based on her 
general intention, she may form the implementation intention that whenever 
she feels the pain of loneliness at home, she will seek to distract herself by 
watching television. Accordingly, the person may automatically turn on the 
TV at home whenever she feels painfully lonely. In the same way that she has 
a positive attitude about her general goal to reduce the pain of loneliness, she 
is likely to have a positive attitude about watching TV because the behavior 
has instrumental value (Vroom, 1964), helping her to reduce loneliness. For 
the same reasons, she may think that important others approve of her watch-
ing TV, as they also support her efforts to relieve the feeling of loneliness.
 The behavior described in this example is automatic and mindless, because 
the person routinely triggers the TV button whenever she feels lonely. The 
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person only relies on automatic behavior, however, because she developed an 
implementation intention as a means to fulfill her general intention. TOPB 
may predict both the person’s general intention to reduce loneliness and the 
implementation intention to watch TV whenever she feels lonely (cf. Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 2005; Bamberg, Ajzen, & Schmidt, 2003, p. 185; Rise, Thomp-
son, & Verplanken, 2003; Connor & Armitage, 1998); however, application 
of TOPB seems to be accurate only in the case that a person’s general inten-
tion remains unchanged and thus remains in line with the derived implemen-
tation intention (Bamberg et al., 2003). If the original motivational 
disposition and thus the original general intention changes, however, a per-
son’s behavior may still follow an “ out- dated”  dragged- in implementation 
intention. In this case, a person may continue to mindlessly pursue behavior 
even if the behavior no longer has any instrumental value because the general 
intention has already changed and may now even be in conflict with the 
behavior (Ji Song & Wood, 2007).
 Another category of behavior linked to implementation intentions is 
habits. Habits can be defined as “learned sequences of acts that have become 
automatic responses to specific cues, and are functional on obtaining certain 
goals or  end- states” (Verplanken & Aarts, 1999, p. 104). A habit is a mental 
construct that relieves the brain as it passes on control over behavior to envi-
ronmental stimuli (Verplanken, 2006). A habit not only includes an action 
routine, but also routinized  decision- making (Betsch, Haberstroh, & Höhle, 
2002). Some researchers argue that it is necessary for a behavior to have been 
conducted and successfully reinforced several times in the past (in similar sit-
uations) to establish a habit (Verplanken, 2006; Oulette & Wood, 1998). In 
contrast, others suggest that an implementation intention lies at the heart of 
every habit (Gollwitzer, 1999; Achtziger et al., 2008), implying that the basis 
of a habit can be established even before the behavior has ever been 
conducted.
 It is commonly the case, however, that implementation intentions develop 
based on past experiences. For example, if a person learns that playing a 
certain video game in the evening at home causes a pleasurable rush of 
euphoria, she/he may form the implementation intention to play the video 
game again in a similar context in the future. The established implementation 
intention is probably stronger with increasing number of times that the 
behavior has been reinforced in the same context, and the more intense the 
repeated reinforcement (Verplanken, 2006).
 If an implementation intention lies at the heart of a habit, the TOBP is 
also able to explain and predict habitual behavior. As argued above, however, 
a person’s motivational disposition must remain in line with their behavioral 
conduct (cf. Bamberg et al., 2003). Habits are usually established by past 
behavior that was rewarded and thus reinforced. To the degree that a per-
son’s experienced reinforcement (e.g., a person’s pleasure reactions) corre-
sponds to his/her motivational disposition (i.e., his/her attitudes, subjective 
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norms, and perceived control over the behavior), TOPB should provide a 
reliable framework in which to predict habitual behavior. Such a correspon-
dence between reinforcement and a person’s motivational disposition is not 
unlikely: people may fail to develop a habit if they hold a negative attitude 
about the behavior or if the behavior is in conflict with their present subjec-
tive norms, as this would clearly undermine the rewarding quality of the 
behavior. Media habits that developed based on (and that remain linked to) a 
person’s motivational disposition may be properly predicted by TOPB; 
however, habits sometimes change into bad habits with a change in the origi-
nal disposition that formerly promoted the behavior. Such bad media habits 
appear to have turned beyond volitional control, and can therefore not be 
explained by the TOPB.
 To a certain degree, persons may still correct their bad habits and align 
them to their motivational disposition. Habits are difficult to control (cf. 
Bargh & Barndollar, 1996; Ji Song & Wood, 2007); however, an established 
habit can be regulated if one is able to generate sufficient willpower. Bamberg 
et al. (2003) demonstrated that people start to intervene and to regulate 
their bad habits once their motivational disposition changes and their habits 
come into conflict with their changed attitudes, perceived social pressure, or 
behavioral control (see also Wood, Tam, & Guerrero Witt, 2005). For 
example, a person may appreciate TV because it helps him/her to calm 
down; accordingly, she/he may have established a habit of watching TV 
before going to bed. Consider the possibility that at some point the person 
reads a persuasive article about the negative effects of watching TV before 
going to bed, and she/he experiences a change in attitude accordingly. The 
person may now start to revise his/her habit and to regulate the automatic 
drive to watch TV before going to bed. That is, the person will seek to bring 
the behavior back under volitional control. To the degree to which a habit 
can be brought back under volitional control—this may be successful if the 
habit is not very strong or if the person directs sufficient effort to changing 
the habit—it will be successfully adjusted to the changed motivational dispo-
sition. TOPB would successfully predict such  re- adjusted behavior.
 TOPB will fail to predict habitual behavior to the extent that people fail 
to change their bad habits; i.e., if habitual behavior occurs even though an 
intention has developed to do otherwise (cf. Heckhausen & Beckmann, 
1990). For example, Ji Song and Wood (2007) revealed that very strong 
habits of watching TV or consuming fast food can prevail over intentions to 
adjust the behavior (see also Verplanken & Wood, 2006); however, the dif-
ference between single behavioral acts and repeated behavior should be noted 
in this regard. TOPB is often applied to the prediction of behavior on an 
aggregate level (e.g., amount of TV watching over the next four weeks). 
While it seems plausible that a single instance of overt impulsive or habitual 
behavior may occur that is not in line with a person’s motivational disposi-
tion, it seems less likely that such  slip- ups would happen repeatedly over a 
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longer period, especially if the motivational disposition had changed substan-
tially, resulting in a strong pressure to break the habit. In particular, people 
may succeed in regulating their behavior and adjusting it to their motiva-
tional disposition if the habit was relatively weakly developed. Accordingly, 
TOPB may explain particularly weak media habits or  re- adjusted media expo-
sure behavior, whereas it will fail to predict strong and bad media habits 
(Ajzen, 1991, 2002; Verplanken, Aarts, van Knippenberg & Moonen, 
1998).
Outside the Borders of TOPB:  Non- voluntary Automatic 
Behavior
While a habit can normally be regulated if a person invests enough effort to 
do so, behavior may also turn completely out of control and become compul-
sive (Loewenstein, 1996; “deficient  self- regulation,” LaRose, this volume). 
Compulsiveness can be defined as an inner urge or drive to perform a behav-
ior that overrides a person’s intention to stop it. Compulsive television use 
(McIlwraith, Jacobvitz, Kubey, & Alexander, 1991), Internet use (Young, 
1998), and  video- game use (Griffiths & Hunt, 1998) have been discussed 
previously in the literature. If media choice becomes compulsive, it can easily 
run counter to a person’s motivational disposition. As stated by Berridge and 
Robinson (1995), a person may start to dislike the behavior, but nevertheless 
still feel a strong want to perform it; in this way, a person’s liking and 
wanting may start to diverge. Therefore, compulsive media choice readily 
disentangles itself from attitudes, subjective norms, and considerations of 
behavioral control. Instead of a person’s motivational disposition, environ-
mental cues (e.g., the television set) or primes (e.g.,  action- related sensations 
or thoughts, such as a certain smell or mood) that  co- occurred with the 
behavior in the past may trigger a want or urge to conduct the behavior. 
Compulsiveness commonly turns out to be problematic, as it may readily 
violate a person’s attitudes, be in conflict with subjective norms, and come at 
an exceedingly high cost regarding a person’s resources. Compulsive media 
choices are by definition outside the scope of volitional control, and are 
therefore beyond the scope of TOPB.
Past Applications of the Theory of Planned 
Behavior to Media Choice
In the past, TOPB has been used as a framework in which to explain and 
predict media choice in different research contexts. In particular, communi-
cation researchers involved in the Uses and Gratifications paradigm adapted 
the precursor of TOPB, the TRA (e.g., Babrow, 1989). Researchers studying 
users’ appropriation of new media technology have also adapted the theoreti-
cal core of TOPB (cf. von Pape, this volume). Finally, psychologists, 
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although not particularly interested in media choice, have on occasions exam-
ined their genuine research questions related to TOPB in the context of 
media use (e.g., Doll & Ajzen, 1992).
Application of TRA/TOPB in Communication Research
In the 1980s, Uses and Gratifications researchers began to study media 
choice by incorporating the core ideas of TRA (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
Babrow, 1989; Babrow & Swanson, 1988; Blood & Galloway, 1983; Gallo-
way & Meek, 1981; LaRose & Atkin, 1988; Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1982, 
1983; Rayburn & Palmgreen, 1984; Van Leuven, 1981). One such core idea 
is the  expectancy- value rationale, which argues that people’s attitude regard-
ing a behavior is a function of their likelihood estimations about certain expe-
riential (e.g., happiness) or instrumental (e.g., money) outcomes multiplied 
by the subjective evaluation of each outcome (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In 
turn, the attitude is considered a determinant of the intention to perform the 
behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Van Leuven (1981) and Galloway and 
Meek (1981) adapted the rationale of  expectancy- value beliefs by arguing 
that the beliefs directly determine media exposure; indeed, in a small survey 
study the latter authors found that  expectancy- value beliefs predicted expo-
sure to television programs.
 This idea was adopted and refined by Palmgreen and Rayburn (1982, 
1983). In an initial survey study, Palmgreen and Rayburn (1982) applied 
 expectancy- value beliefs to determine both users’ attitudes about television 
news (measured by a single item: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the job 
television news programs do in providing you with the things you are 
seeking?”) and users’ gratifications sought from television news (i.e., “the 
general tendency to seek multiple gratifications [from the medium],” p. 568; 
e.g., “I watch TV news to keep up with current issues and events”). The 
authors stressed that users’ expectancy beliefs can focus on both the attri-
butes of a media offering (cf. Wolling, this volume) and the behavioral out-
comes associated with the anticipated exposure. In contrast to TRA, which 
links attitudes to intentions that in turn precede actual behavior, they further 
argued that both the attitude and gratifications are the immediate determi-
nants of actual news exposure. It remains unclear as to why intentions were 
not considered in the conceptualization. In their study, Palmgreen and 
Rayburn found that  expectancy- value beliefs regarding TV news predicted 
about 30 percent of the variance of both users’ sought gratifications and atti-
tude about TV news. Users’ perceived importance of each anticipated aspect 
or outcome added little to the predictive power of the  expectancy- value term 
(but see also van der Pligt & de Vries, 1998). Only sought gratifications (and 
not users’ attitude to TV news) were significantly linked to actual TV news 
exposure; however, sought gratifications only accounted for 5 percent of the 
variance of exposure to TV news. The approach adopted in measuring 
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 attitude was also somewhat unusual (i.e., a single item about general satisfac-
tion with TV news), thereby limiting the quality of the results (Babrow, 
1989; Doll & Hasebrink, 1989).
 A second survey study (Rayburn & Palmgreen, 1984) tested parts of the 
conceptualization that  expectancy- value beliefs about TV news predict grati-
fications sought, which in turn lead to actual TV news exposure. Use of TV 
news, in turn, was thought to result in obtained gratifications, and the grati-
fications obtained by a user were thought to feed back to modify the expec-
tancies (but not the evaluations) of attributes or behavioral outcomes 
associated with watching TV news. A major weakness of the survey, and 
despite the process character of the conceptualized model, was that it was 
conducted as a  cross- sectional study. In addition, exposure to TV news was 
not assessed. The study results showed a significant correlation between 
 expectancy- value beliefs and gratifications sought (and an even stronger cor-
relation with gratifications obtained). In turn, gratifications obtained did 
indeed show a stronger correlation with users’ expectancies than with their 
evaluations.
 The link between  expectancy- value beliefs and media exposure also 
inspired research by Babrow and colleagues (Babrow & Swanson, 1988; 
Babrow, 1989; Swanson & Babrow, 1989). The conceptualization of media 
choice suggested by Babrow and colleagues adapted TRA more carefully 
than the early approaches by Palmgreen and Rayburn. In an initial study, 
Babrow and Swanson (1988) applied a more valid measure of users’ attitude 
and added a measurement of the intention to watch TV news. As in TRA, 
the intention to watch TV news was considered to rest on both users’ atti-
tudes and subjective norms about the behavior. In accordance with 
Palmgreen and Rayburn (1982), gratifications sought were also an object of 
analysis in the study; however, their role in the process of media choice 
remained somewhat unclear. A structural equation model was used to test 
the proposed relationships. Although the overall model showed a relatively 
poor fit, the result of statistically significant path coefficients confirmed the 
validity of the TRA:  expectancy- value beliefs predicted attitude about TV 
news, the attitude predicted intention to watch TV news, and in turn the 
intention predicted actual exposure to TV news. A separate analysis, however, 
showed that subjective norms did not predict the intention to watch TV 
news.
 Also in line with TRA, a second study by Babrow (1989) regarding the 
watching of daytime soap operas replicated the finding that users’ attitudes 
towards TV watching are a function of  expectancy- value beliefs. In turn, the 
attitudes affected users’ intention to watch, and intention significantly pre-
dicted the actual amount of watching that took place. Normative beliefs were 
also assessed in the study, in an even more  multi- faceted manner than that 
suggested by TRA; however, unlike the suggestion implicit in TRA, the mea-
surement of subjective norms only considered what respondents believed 
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others would think about watching soap operas. The second component of 
subjective beliefs (i.e., respondents’ motivation to comply with these expecta-
tions) remained unassessed. Still, normative beliefs exerted an influence on the 
intention to watch, although the effect was considerably smaller than that for 
attitude. In general terms, the study built upon firm theoretical grounds and 
led to several methodological advances. For example, the survey consisted of 
two waves: respondents were first asked about  expectancy- value beliefs and 
their intention to watch soap operas over the next week; one week later they 
were asked about their actual viewing amount during the past week.
 In summary, the above studies demonstrate that TRA provides a fruitful 
framework in which to study media choice, although some of the early studies 
were flawed (cf. Doll & Hasebrink, 1989). Surprisingly, despite these promising 
early steps the line of research ceased in communication research after the 1980s. 
Only a small number of more recent studies have sought to apply elements of 
TRA or TOPB to media choice. Of these, several focused almost entirely on 
 expectancy- value theory, but did not apply the total structure of TRA or TOPB 
(e.g., for “news pagers,” Leung & Wei, 1999; “TV prevention news stories,” 
Cooper, Burgoon, & Roter, 2001). Other studies considered TOPB more thor-
oughly, but focused on users’ intention to adopt a medium rather than actual 
media exposure (e.g., “intention to adopt the Internet,” Chia, Detenber, & Lee, 
2006; “intention to adopt text messaging services,” Pedersen, & Nysveen, 
20062; “intention to use virtual communities,” Lin, 2006).
 A revival of TRA/TOPB approach in communication research on media 
choice appears timely. Since the 1980s, TRA has been replaced by the more 
advanced conceptualization of TOPB, and several theoretical extensions 
(Conner & Armitage, 1989) and methodological improvements (Ajzen, 
2006) have been suggested. Nabi and Krcmar (2004, pp. 297–299) sug-
gested the use of TOPB in determining how attitudes are derived from media 
entertainment fare, and, in turn, predict future exposure to entertaining 
content. In a recent survey study, Hartmann and Vorderer (2006) applied 
TOPB in studying users’ exposure to video games. Respondents’ attitudes 
towards playing video games over the upcoming 14 days and their perceived 
behavioral control over playing games accounted for about 79 percent of the 
variance in the intention to play (subjective norms showed no effect; for 
similar findings, see Lin, 2006). In turn, respondents’ intention predicted 23 
percent of the variance of the actual amount of video game exposure mea-
sured 14 days later.
Application of TRA/TOPB to Media Choice in Other 
Scientific Domains
TOPB and its precursor, TRA, also inspired research on media choice in sci-
entific domains other than communication research. The technology accep-
tance model (TAM; Davis, 1986; Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989; 
269_03_Media Choice.indd   43 23/1/09   11:19:13
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
44  T. Hartmann
Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; for overviews, see Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & 
Davis, 2003; von Pape, this volume) provides one popular example. The 
TAM was developed as “an adaptation of TRA specifically tailored for mod-
eling user acceptance of information systems” (Davis et al., 1989, p. 985). 
According to the original model, people hold a positive attitude towards 
using computer technology if they believe that the system is useful and easy 
to use. Perceived usefulness is defined as “the prospective user’s subjective 
probability that using a specific application system will increase his or her job 
performance within an organizational context” (p. 985). Perceived ease of 
use is defined as “the degree to which the prospective user expects the target 
system to be free of effort” (p. 985). Departing from TRA, the original TAM 
further argued that the behavioral attitude (reflecting intrinsic rewards) and 
perceived usefulness (reflecting extrinsic rewards) predict the intention to use 
computer technology; subjective norms were not considered. An empirical 
test of the original model suggested that the conceptualization is more parsi-
monious if users’ attitudes are neglected, and perceived usefulness and per-
ceived ease of use are considered direct determinants of the intention to use 
computer technology. In a series of  follow- up studies, Venkatesh and Davis 
(2000) further enhanced this model, demonstrating that in addition to per-
ceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, the intention to use computer 
technology is affected by subjective norms.
 A number of  psychology- based studies that sought to either challenge or 
advance TOPB (e.g., Doll & Ajzen, 1992; Ouelette & Wood, 1998) or that 
used the model to pursue questions in applied research (e.g., Huang & 
Chuang, 2007; Doll, Petersen, & Rudolf, 2000) also shed light on media 
choice. For example, Doll and Ajzen (1992) examined the hypothesis that 
attitudes toward and perceived behavioral control of a behavior (e.g., using a 
medium) are more accessible and stable if they rest on a direct (e.g., using) 
rather than indirect (e.g., watching) experience with a behavioral object. The 
authors further examined how these behavioral beliefs, once developed, 
guide future behavior. To test their assumptions, they ran a laboratory exper-
iment in which participants either watched or played six different video 
games, thereby forming behavioral beliefs about the playing of each game. At 
the end of the experiments, the participants had 45 minutes remaining to 
freely choose and play any game. The results showed that attitudes and 
behavioral control were indeed more accessible and stable if they resulted 
from the actual use of video games rather than merely watching the games. 
In turn, highly accessible behavioral beliefs affected the intention to play spe-
cific games in the 45-minute period of free time; again, intention and per-
ceived behavioral control predicted the amount of actual exposure (see also 
Glasman & Albarracin, 2006).
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Towards a Theory of Planned Media Choice
The reviewed studies demonstrate that TOPB, as well as its precursor TRA, 
provides a useful conceptualization within which to explore media choice; 
however, a concise and empirically corroborated theory of planned media 
choice has yet to be developed. Past applications of TOPB in the realm of 
media choice focused on a range of markedly different aspects: taken 
together, they do not represent a coherent line of research. Therefore, both 
theoretical and empirical progress is required to move ahead towards a theory 
of planned media choice.
Theoretical Progress
TOPB provides a powerful framework in which to predict voluntary human 
behavior. Despite the popularity of this theory in social psychology or health 
psychology, communication researchers involved in conceptualizing media 
choice have paid surprisingly little attention to the theory in the past. Uses 
and Gratification researchers took notice of TOPB’s precursor, the TRA, but 
in general focused on  expectancy- value mechanisms while neglecting any 
solid application of the entire framework to the realm of media choice. In 
addition, there exist few critical theoretical reflections of the genuine applica-
bility of TOPB to media choice (cf. LaRose, this volume).
 At its core, TOPB predicts behavior that is under complete volitional 
control (i.e., that builds on rather explicit and elaborate attitudes, subjective 
norms and control beliefs) and that results in a deliberate decision and the 
intention to conduct the behavior. Accordingly, TOPB should be especially 
capable in explaining and predicting any type of elaborate, planned or delib-
erate media choices. Media choices are likely to be planned if persons care 
about the decision because it involves a considerable risk (i.e., investment of 
time, money and other resources) for an uncertain outcome (Fazio, 1999; 
Esser, 1996; Payne et al., 1993). Risky media choices typically result in single 
behavioral acts, whereas repeated performance is more likely if the behavior is 
less risky (low investment costs and/or high certainty). The purchase of 
expensive media technology such as a computer or a television screen repre-
sents a typical example of a risky media choice;  movie- going may provide 
another example that involves considerable risk. Media choices may also be 
risky, and therefore planned, if a person is highly unfamiliar with the choice 
and with anticipating behavioral outcomes. Next to the adoption of new 
media technology (cf. von Pape, this volume), other valid examples of risky 
media choices include choosing new software for the computer, deciding to 
become familiar with a new website or service on the Internet, and deciding 
to spent time playing a newly released video game. Seeking a certain show on 
television is also risky, especially if it is only broadcasted once at a specific 
time on a specific channel and therefore could be easily missed. All of the 
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above choices must be based on careful, conscious anticipations if they are to 
result in reasonable intentions and not a waste of considerable volitional 
effort. TOPB should provide a valid and useful framework in which to 
examine such media choices.
 TOPB, however, is the subject of an ongoing discussion (cf. Conner & 
Armitage, 1998). This discussion must not be neglected on the path towards 
a theory of planned media choice. It may be discussed, for example, whether 
the  expectancy- value mechanism proposed by TOPB is a valid conceptualiza-
tion of elaborate choices (e.g., Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 2000; Wolling, this 
volume). References to decision theory may be helpful in substantiating the 
discussion (cf. Marewski et al., this volume; Payne et al., 1993). In addition, 
the behavioral determinants laid out in TOPB may prove to be insufficient in 
explaining all forms of media choices. For example, next to subjective norms 
(e.g., “important others dis/approve of me doing . . .”), personal moral 
norms may guide planned media choices (e.g., “I personally feel that I ought 
to do . . .”; Park & Smith, 2007).
 In its current version, TOPB does not fully reflect the role of emotions 
that underlie the development of an intention; emotions may have a crucial 
impact on choices and planned media exposure (Loewenstein & Lerner, 
2003), especially if the choice entails exposure to entertaining media. Fur-
thermore, TOPB does not incorporate alternative choices (cf. Marewski et 
al., this volume), whereas people’s media choices are commonly based on 
several available options (e.g., other  leisure- time activities; Palmgreen & 
Rayburn, 1982, p. 574). For example, despite a favorable motivational dispo-
sition towards playing video games, people may still fail to form an intention 
to play if other more attractive alternatives exist.
 Finally, TOPB primarily models the motivational stage of planned behav-
ior (i.e., the development of an intention): the model tells us less about the 
volitional stage (i.e., how selected intentions are protected against other 
action plans and eventually result in actual exposure; Achtziger et al., 2008; 
Brandstaetter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gollwitzer, 1990). For 
example, despite holding an intention to play video games, people may 
choose not to play because they are distracted by other interfering activities 
or duties. On the path towards a theory of planned media choice, researchers 
should carefully apply the core concept of TOPB without losing track of the 
ongoing debate about TOPB.
 Future research should also explore the question of whether TOPB, 
despite its name, helps to illuminate media behavior that is somewhat less 
voluntary; i.e., behavior that rests on largely automatic choices and that is 
pursued in a mindless fashion. Media habits provide typical examples of such 
automatic behavior. TOPB may successfully explain such media behavior if it 
is analyzed as repeated behavioral conduct on an aggregate level (e.g., fre-
quency of choosing to watch a TV soap opera within a period of 14 days). I 
suggested in this chapter that the motivational dispositions laid out in TOPB 
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may serve as a foundation on which to develop a media habit. Motivational 
dispositions that speak against a certain media choice make it less likely that 
the exposure will repeatedly take place; thus, the establishment of a media 
habit also becomes unlikely. Even if a media habit has become established, 
unfavorable motivational dispositions may urge a person to intervene in the 
behavioral conduct; however, the question of under what circumstances 
people may feel an urge to change a media habit, as well as under what con-
ditions they fail or succeed to do so, remains open to discussion (cf. Ji Song 
& Wood, 2007). A careful consideration of  socio- cognitive theory of media 
use (LaRose, this volume), particularly of the role of  self- regulation, may be 
helpful in substantiating this discussion.
Empirical Progress
Past research that linked TRA or TOPB, or at least elements of both models, 
to the realm of media choice has led to promising results, yet few studies have 
appropriately adopted the full model of TOPB in predicting media choice. To 
develop proper assessments, researchers should consult the many recommen-
dations made in the literature regarding how to assess the constructs of TOPB 
(Ajzen, 2006; Francis et al., 2004; Gagné & Godin, 2000). In general, TOPB 
is assessed by questionnaires, and any study should ideally include at least two 
waves. In the first wave, the standard constructs of TOPB are measured, 
including intensity or frequency of past behavior, along with the respondents’ 
intentions to perform the same media behavior throughout a specified period 
in the future. After this period has elapsed, data are collected in a second 
wave, in which respondents are asked about how frequently or intensively they 
pursued the behavior. In addition, the second wave usually repeats the assess-
ment of the constructs of TOPB (at least by applying the direct measures). 
Thus, test–retest reliabilities can be calculated to assess the psychometric qual-
ities of the scales. Researchers may also test if respondents changed their moti-
vational disposition and intention since wave 1.
Concluding Remarks
TOPB is one of the most mature and popular theories in social psychology in 
predicting human behavior. Sutton (1982) showed that TOPB usually pre-
dicts between 40 percent and 50 percent of the variance in intention and 
between 19 percent and 38 percent of the variance in behavior. In the past, 
application of TOPB to media choice in communication research and related 
disciplines did not move beyond insular efforts. It would therefore represent 
an innovative line of research to explain and predict media exposure based on 
TOPB. Such an emerging new theory on media choice may help to advance 
the existing body of knowledge on the topic, as it would enrich a healthy 
competition with other models that aim to predict people’s media choices.
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